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SUMMARY 
This briefing note uses a newly completed time series on the government of 
Alberta’s finances to present a broad overview of the government’s budgetary 
choices since fiscal year 1965–66. The note paints a picture using broad strokes 
that focuses on the government’s attempts to deal with volatile energy revenues. 
It shows that over the past 50 years the government has made a policy choice 
to allow volatility in energy revenues to create volatility in its budget. This policy 
choice has resulted in occasional bouts of severe spending contractions and likely 
encouraged higher rates of spending and lower taxation than would otherwise 
have been observed. These outcomes are the result of the government failing to 
heed the advice of economists, namely, to save energy revenues and in this way 
establish a steady and reliable source of revenue.
In the note we describe a number of strategies the government has used over 
the years to reduce its reliance on energy revenue. Success came only after 
a dramatic cut to program spending in the mid-1990s. Only during this brief 
period in the mid-1990s was the government able to fund current expenditures 
without the need for energy revenues. To use a phrase made popular in the 
2015 provincial election campaign, for that brief period in the mid-1990s, the 
government had managed to climb “off the energy roller-coaster.” But it could 
not stay off, and the government, with the support of voters, returned to a pattern 
of financing spending growth not with taxation but with energy revenues.
At the time of writing this note, the current government is suffering the 
consequences of a budget based on spending and tax choices that require a 
heavy reliance on energy revenues to find balance. Getting off the energy roller 
coaster requires new revenue, cuts to program spending, or some combination 
of the two. To remain off the roller coaster requires a commitment of the sort 
previous governments have been unable to stick to.
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1INTRODUCTION
Our goal in this briefing note is to use a newly completed time series on the government of 
Alberta’s finances to present a broad overview of the government’s fiscal choices since fiscal year 
1965–66. We will paint a picture using broad strokes that focuses on the government’s attempts 
to deal with volatile energy revenues. Anticipating our discussion we show that, over the past 50 
years, the government has allowed volatility in energy revenues to create volatility in its budget. 
This policy choice has resulted in occasional bouts of severe spending contractions and likely 
encouraged higher rates of spending and lower taxation than would otherwise have been observed. 
In ways we will describe below, the fiscal choices that governments in Alberta have made are 
predictable of a government and an electorate that seeks higher spending when the price of that 
spending is low. Unfortunately, this same government and electorate must then respond to the fiscal 
consequences when that price rises. The price of government spending is measured by the taxes 
that citizens pay out of their incomes. In Alberta, it is a price that governments have kept low by an 
overdependence on oil and gas royalties.
THE DATA
As we have described in a previous paper (Kneebone and Wilkins 2016), Statistics Canada has 
halted the provision of a data set allowing for a comparison of provincial government spending 
over a long period of time. The data on provincial government finances currently published by 
Statistics Canada (contained in Table 10-10-0017-01; formerly CANSIM Table 385-0034) provide 
only a short time series (it begins with data from 2008). They also define revenue and expenditure 
categories that do not correspond to those reported in previously published data sets and so 
make linking the new data series with previous versions difficult. This is an issue for researchers 
interested in tracking how the provincial government’s fiscal choices have changed over time, how 
those choices have responded to periods of recession and expansion, how they might change with 
new governments, and so forth. It is also an issue for taxpayers hoping to benchmark the fiscal 
performance of their current government to those in the past.
To fill the data gap in a way that allows one to evaluate the government’s fiscal performance over 
a long period of time, we have constructed a time series of the government’s spending and revenue 
categories spanning the period from fiscal year 1965–66 to 2016–17. Details on the construction of 
these data are provided in the appendix. 
In what follows, we present these data in real per capita terms unless otherwise stated.1 That is to 
say, the data we present have been adjusted for both population and for inflation. The dollar values 
we present, therefore, should be understood to represent the average amount spent on (and the 
average amount of revenue collected from) every adult and child in Alberta measured in prices as 
they existed in 2017.
Our discussion will revolve around four figures that we believe capture the key elements that have 
shaped the Alberta government’s fiscal choices.
1 
Deflated using the all-items consumer price index (CPI). Values for 1965 to 1971 are based on information in the Historical 
Statistics of Canada, 2nd Edition, 1983. For years 1971–78, a simple average of CPI data for Calgary and Edmonton is used 
to represent Alberta. After 1978, an Alberta CPI is available from CANSIM Table 18-10-0005-01. Population data are from 
CANSIM Table 17-10-0009-01. 
2IN THE BEGINNING
The defining characteristic of the government of Alberta’s finances is a heavy reliance on the 
revenue the province receives from the production and sale of non-renewable resources, in 
particular oil, natural gas and coal.2 Although the provincial government has received revenue from 
non-renewable resources from nearly the start of its entry into Confederation in 1905, it was only 
with the discovery of a major pool of oil near Leduc in 1947 that these revenues began to make a 
noticeable contribution to the provincial treasury.3
Figure 1 reports the amounts of energy revenues collected by the provincial government since 
1965–66. The data are presented in real per capita terms. The volatility of these revenues is 
remarkable and plays a key role in the government’s budgeting choices over the past 50 years. The 
figure also shows the amount of energy revenues transferred to the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust 
Fund (AHSTF) in those years when those transfers occurred.4
In the years prior to 1947, the provincial government maintained more or less balanced budgets 
(Boothe 1995). That is to say, total expenditures were closely matched by total revenues resulting in 
very small budget imbalances — both positive (surpluses) and negative (deficits). This pattern reflects 
a policy preference at the time to match requests or needs for new spending with new taxation.
Following Leduc, the provincial government enjoyed the advantage of receiving small but fairly 
predictable amounts of revenue in the form of energy revenues. The government (perhaps quite 
sensibly for one that, at the time, offered relatively little in the way of social programs) had no plans 
to save energy revenue and instead used it to finance current spending.5 The result was the creation 
of what would prove to be a persistent gap separating spending from non-energy revenues. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
In public accounts, the total amount of revenue directly collected by the provincial government due to the exploitation 
of non-renewable energy is referred to as Non-Renewable Resource Revenue. These revenues consist mainly of royalties 
received on sales of natural gas, crude oil, synthetic oil, bitumen, and coal, but also include revenues from the sale of 
exploration leases and other rentals and fees. In what follows we refer to all these revenues as energy revenues. Note that 
these revenues do not include the corporate-income-tax revenue the government collects indirectly as a result of energy 
production.
See Boothe (1995) and Boothe and Edwards (2003) for discussions of Alberta’s early fiscal history.
Transfers of provincial government energy revenues to the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund are reported in AHSTF 
(2017).
Immediately following the Leduc discovery, the provincial government used the new revenue to begin to modernize 
social programs. During the 1950s, the provincial government assumed responsibility for old-age and blind-person’s 
pensions, introduced a student loan program, and established a hospital insurance program. Free medicare for the needy 
was introduced in 1963. Provincial government spending on health care and education increased from 16 and 15 per cent, 
respectively, of program spending in 1952, to 23 and 33 per cent by 1962. See Boothe (1995, 41).
3FIGURE 1 ENERGY REVENUES
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By 1965–66, excluding resource revenue, total non-energy-related revenue was $1,823 per person 
while total program spending was $2,299 per person (2017 dollars). The difference in that year and 
in most years during the period before 1970, was more than filled by energy revenues ($1,378 per 
person in 1965–66). Albertans were therefore paying a relatively low “tax price” for the publicly 
provided goods and services they were receiving.6
THE GARDEN OF EDEN
In the eight years prior to the first OPEC oil-price shock in 1974, the government of Alberta’s 
resource revenues averaged $0.260 billion (nominal dollars). The effect of the OPEC price shock, 
combined with the efforts of the newly elected (in 1971) Progressive Conservative government 
of Peter Lougheed to negotiate a new royalty framework, contributed to a dramatic increase in 
resource revenues.7 In the eight years following the first OPEC oil-price shock, resource revenues 
averaged $2.7 billion per year in nominal dollars.
The rapid growth in resource revenues caused the government to establish the Alberta Heritage 
Savings Trust Fund (AHSTF) in 1976. Established with a special appropriation of $1.5 billion,  
the government further committed to depositing 30 per cent of resource revenue collected into  
the AHSTF. 
6 
7 
The tax price is a measure of the ratio of tax revenue collected divided by program expenditures. A value of one (1) would 
indicate tax payments exactly matched program spending. The tax price falls as revenues raised by means other than 
taxation — federal transfers, borrowing and energy revenues — increase. As the tax price falls, economists expect to 
observe voters favouring higher government spending.
Lougheed’s renegotiation of energy royalties in 1972 caused considerable displeasure in the oil and gas industry, which 
argued for the sanctity of royalty contracts signed in 1949. See Doern and Toner (1985) for a description and discussion. 
4Saving non-renewable-resource revenue for the benefit of future generations of Albertans was one 
of the three goals identified for the AHSTF upon its establishment. The other goals were to provide 
benefits to the current generation of Albertans and to diversify the provincial economy. Boothe 
(1995) reports the results of interviews with policy-makers in power at the time, which suggest a 
fourth goal: that the diversion of energy revenues to the AHSTF was useful and effective at taming 
expectations for increased spending.8 By the end of fiscal year 1982, the AHSTF had received $8.3 
billion of energy revenue and had earned $2.65 billion in investment income. Despite $1.3 billion 
of spending on capital projects, the AHSTF was valued at $9.662 billion in 1982.9
By the end of the 1970s, the second OPEC oil-price shock left the provincial government enjoying 
high levels of resource revenues that enabled it to keep tax rates low and to put in place a strategy 
for saving a significant portion of resource revenues. Expectations that oil prices would not only 
remain high but likely increase still further were behind the musings of the provincial treasurer 
who, in 1978, noting satisfaction with low levels of taxation, high levels of government services, 
and ongoing budget surpluses, raised the possibility of increasing the share of energy revenue 
committed to the AHSTF.10 This optimism must have soothed anyone expressing concern over 
the fact the gap in the non-energy primary budget — the difference between program spending 
and non-energy-related revenues — had grown to nearly $5,200 per person by 1979–80.11 To put 
this differently, by the end of fiscal year 1979–80, non-energy-related revenues would have had 
to have been higher by $5,200 per person to pay for the government’s program spending. As this 
calculation suggests, the tax price on government program spending was exceedingly low. Still, as 
shown in Figure 2, energy revenues, equal to nearly $7,500 per person in 1979–80, were more than 
sufficient to fill the gap in the non-energy primary budget and still allow, as shown in Figure 1, for 
a transfer of energy revenues into the AHSTF of nearly $2,000 per capita.
8 
9 
10 
11
Doern and Toner (1985, 101) note that the federal government, under then prime minister John Turner, was also strongly 
supportive of the establishment of the AHSTF as a way of keeping Alberta’s resource revenues out of the revenue formula 
governing the federal equalization program.
The monetary amounts identified in this paragraph are nominal values. The $9.662 billion in the AHSTF in 1982 is the 
equivalent of $26.6 billion in 2017 dollars. As we describe below, the government would soon stop making contributions to 
the AHSTF and would also begin to withdraw all investment income earned by the fund. As a result, the real value of the 
fund would shrink over time. As of March 31, 2018, the AHSTF was valued at $15.6 billion. (AHSTF, 2018).
Budget address of Treasurer Marv Leitch, March 17, 1978. Cited in Boothe (1995). The optimism over future fiscal prospects 
also prompted the government in 1979 to retire the debts of all municipalities in the province. For a description of that 
initiative see n.a. (1979).
The non-energy primary balance is defined as program spending less all sources of non-energy revenues. It is a concept often 
used to evaluate the fiscal sustainability of governments heavily dependent upon resource revenues. See, for example, Barnett 
and Ossowski (2002). It is an interesting measure as it defines the net amount borrowed from future taxpayers, either in the 
form of bond issues or by spending, rather than saving the revenues earned from the sale of non-renewable resources.
5FIGURE 2 FILLING THE GAP
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PRIDE GOES BEFORE A FALL
The rosy budgetary picture of the 1970s came to an abrupt end early in the next decade. The 1980 
National Energy Program (NEP) and a deep North America-wide recession beginning in 1982 
combined to wreak havoc on the provincial budget. The recession slowed the economy and the 
NEP not only slowed the growth in resource revenues by reducing the price at which Alberta could 
sell oil in Canada but it also prompted the provincial government to increase spending in the form 
of support to the energy industry.12 The effects of these events on the budget surplus were mitigated 
by the decision in 1982 to divert the investment income earned by the AHSTF to general revenues 
and to reduce the percentage of resource revenue deposited in the AHSTF from 30 to 15 per cent. 
The two fiscal adjustments at the time were envisioned to be temporary measures lasting only for 
two fiscal years but would prove to be permanent. These measures, plus a renegotiation of some 
aspects of the NEP13 that caused energy revenues to recover, enabled the provincial government to 
remain in budgetary surplus until 1985.
As shown in Figure 3, by 1984–85 the government had managed to more or less halt the rapid 
growth in program spending that had characterized the 1970s. Between 1965–66 and 1984–85, 
spending on the “big three” programs — health, education, and social services — had nearly 
quadrupled in real per capita dollar terms, but had seemingly plateaued by the mid-1980s.
12 
Provincial support for the industry included a $5.4-billion program, introduced in 1982, consisting of royalty reductions and 
grants designed to increase the flow of revenue to the industry. In the same year, the federal government would supplement 
this effort with its own $2-billion assistance plan (Doern and Toner 1985, 114-115). Measured in 2017 dollars these two support 
programs were worth $20.4 billion.
13 
Following its introduction in October 1980, the NEP controlled oil prices in Canada. Through a series of negotiated settlements 
between the province of Alberta and the federal government, prices of “old oil” (discovered prior to 1980) were set as a 
percentage of the world price. In an agreement signed in 1983, the price of “new oil” was allowed to rise to the world price.
6Unfortunately, there came a second collapse in world oil prices in 1986, when the WTI price of 
oil fell by 48 per cent relative to its value in 1985. The resulting loss of revenue devastated the 
provincial budget. The budget for fiscal year 1986–87 felt the brunt of a 62-per-cent loss in energy 
revenue and 28-per-cent loss in total revenue relative to the previous year. The new premier elected 
in 1986, Don Getty, noted that he had “inherited an economy and budget based on $40 oil—and the 
price of oil was $13.”14 The government’s immediate response was to redirect more energy revenue 
into the budget. With fiscal year 1987–88, the government completely abandoned its efforts to save 
non-renewable-resource revenues and began diverting all investment income earned by the now 
moribund AHSTF into general revenues. This effort was not nearly enough, however. As shown in 
Figure 2, beginning in 1986–87, energy revenues were no longer sufficient to fill the non-energy 
primary deficit. The budget now fell into deficit.
FIGURE 3 PROGRAM SPENDING AND DEBT SERVICE
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On the expenditure side, after 1986–87 the government was only able to hold spending constant 
in real per capita terms. It seemed stubbornly unable to respond in a more significant way to the 
loss of revenue. As a consequence, and despite the aforementioned diversion of energy revenues 
into the budget and away from the Heritage Fund, the budget plunged into deficit beginning in 
1985–86 and would remain in deficit for nine straight years. Between fiscal years 1985–86 and 
1992–93 (inclusive) the provincial government accumulated over $18 billion in net debt ($37 billion 
in 2017 dollars), an amount equal to nearly 22 per cent of 1993 GDP. The non-energy primary 
deficit was $2,651 per person in 1992–93 and the combination of growing debt and high interest 
rates caused debt-servicing costs to approach spending on social services as the third largest of the 
government’s expenditures.
14 
Quoted in Boothe (1995), page 94.
7THE BINDING OF ISAAC …
The 1993 provincial election in Alberta was fought over how to respond to the rapid accumulation 
of debt that had occurred over the previous nine years. All three major political parties supported 
taking strong steps to eliminate the deficit and both the Liberal and Progressive Conservative 
parties advocated deep cuts to government spending in order to achieve it. The Progressive 
Conservatives, led by new leader Ralph Klein, were elected to a majority government in June 1993 
on a platform of a 20-per-cent cut to spending.
The vertical red line in Figure 3 marks the election of Klein and the start of a large cut in real per 
capita program spending. Between 1992–93 and 1996–97, real per capita program spending on 
health, education, and social services fell by 19 per cent, 15 per cent, and 29 per cent, respectively.15 
While the cuts to program spending were the most public of the new government’s efforts to 
regain control of its finances, they were not the only measures taken. The budgeting process would 
also change. Important in that regard was the introduction of an easily measured and understood 
target: a zero deficit. The unwavering dedication to meeting that target by both the premier and 
the treasurer was as significant as the speed with which it was accomplished.16 The adoption 
of the zero-deficit target provided the government with the opportunity to build credibility by 
systematically meeting pre-announced deficit targets on the way to the goal of a balanced budget. 
Figure 2 shows that by 1995–96, the non-energy primary deficit had fallen to zero. The effort to 
cut program spending and the fiscal constraints that kept spending under control had succeeded 
in ending the government’s dependence on energy revenues. It was no longer necessary to rely on 
energy revenues to pay for programs. Resource revenues were again more than enough to cover 
the non-energy primary deficit and so budget surpluses returned. The non-energy primary deficit 
remained near zero for four years, enabling large surpluses and a rapid reduction in debt.17
… AND HIS RELEASE
The efforts to restrain spending and minimize the non-energy primary deficit began to weaken 
when, in 2000–01, resource revenues spiked and came in at an unprecedented $10.6 billion 
(nominal), an amount more than $7-billion higher than the average level of resource revenue 
realized over the previous five years. With the zero-deficit rule now toothless — the budget moved 
to balance and then into surplus by 1994–95 — there seemed little to hold spending in check or to 
discourage further tax cuts. New efforts to bind the government were introduced, but these proved 
only temporarily effective. The Financial Statutes Amendment Act, 2003 introduced a dollar cap on 
the amount of energy revenue that the government could use for fiscal policy purposes. Beginning 
with the budget for fiscal year 2004, the amount of resource revenue available to finance 
government 
15 
The large cut to social services was driven in large part by both a reform in how social assistance was provided and a 
reduction in the monthly amounts paid. Alberta was not alone in making these adjustments. See Kneebone and White 
(2009) for discussion.
16 
In fact, the deficit was eliminated by the end of fiscal year 1995, a year ahead of schedule. Kneebone and McKenzie (1997) 
report the results of interviews conducted with Klein, six cabinet ministers, seven MLAs, 13 senior civil servants, and 21 
representatives of school boards, colleges, universities, health authorities and social service agencies. Interviewees were 
consistent in identifying the commitment to the zero-deficit target and the unswerving commitment to spending cuts as 
being instrumental in minimizing opposition and easing their implementation.
17 
For this brief period then, the government implemented the fiscal approach economists have long suggested as appropriate 
for governments with access to non-renewable resource revenues: namely, to save those revenues and in this way turn a non-
renewable physical resource into a permanent monetary resource. The government of Norway is frequently identified as a 
government adopting that advice. For a discussion of the implications for Alberta adopting this model, see Van den Bremer 
and Van der Ploeg (2014). 
8spending was limited, to be no more than $3.5 billion.18 Effective with each of the next two budgets, 
the rule determining the amount of resource revenue the government could use for fiscal policy 
purposes was adjusted upward. Thus, the Fiscal Responsibility Amendment Act, 2004, adjusted the 
fixed amount from $3.5 to $4.0 billion (effective for fiscal year 2005) while the Financial Statutes 
Amendment Act, 2005 adjusted the fixed amount again, to $4.75 billion (effective for the 2006 
fiscal year). 
The generous nature of these rules and the ease with which they could be relaxed gave the 
government access to a flood of new revenue. Almost immediately, program spending roared back, 
particularly in health but also in education (see Figure 3). In addition, new tax cuts were introduced 
in the form of a 10-per-cent flat income tax rate (2001) and a cut to the general corporate income 
tax rate (2006). The non-energy primary deficit similarly increased and returned close to where it 
was prior to the 1993 election (Figure 2). Clearly the binds intended to restrain spending and tax 
cuts were no match for the temptation of higher energy revenues. Still, budget surpluses remained, 
thanks to high levels of resource revenues.
THE SECOND TEMPTATION
The period 2004–05 to 2007–08 was witness to another jump in energy revenues. Tempted by yet 
another large inflow of resource revenue, and after abandoning efforts to limit its access to these 
revenues with legislation, the government again proved unable to resist the lure of easy money. 
By 2001–02, real per capita health spending returned to the level prior to the Klein cutbacks and 
by 2008–09 it was 80-per-cent higher than in 1995–96. Real per capita spending on education did 
not increase as quickly, but by 2008–09 it had returned to what it was prior to the Klein cutbacks. 
These spending increases were occurring without increases in tax rates, the result being that the 
non-energy primary deficit quickly increased (see Figure 2). Energy revenues remained high up 
until 2007–08, with the result that the government was able to report large budget surpluses even in 
the face of large spending increases. All this was about to change.
RETRIBUTION
In 2008–09 alone, the non-energy primary deficit nearly doubled from what it was in the previous 
year and was now just short of $4,000 per person. This proved to be bad timing as, in the previous 
two years, energy revenues had fallen by nearly $2,000 per capita and would fall by a similar 
amount again in the next year. By 2008–09, energy revenues had fallen below the non-energy 
primary deficit. It would remain so but for a brief respite in 2013–14 and 2014–15, which followed 
efforts to rein in spending and so shrink the non-energy primary deficit — an effort that notably 
exempted health spending. The effort to restrain spending was short-lived, however, and the non-
energy primary deficit increased again in 2015–16 and 2016–17. Once again, the timing was bad as, 
in these same years, real per capita energy revenues plummeted to levels below those observed in 
the 1960s (Figure 1).
At the end of our time period, the government’s finances were such that energy revenues were 
nowhere near sufficient to fill the non-energy primary deficit. In fact, the shortfall in 2016–17 
($2,594 per capita) was similar to the one in 1986–87 ($3,320 per capita) that prompted the cuts to 
18 
The act required that all amounts of resource revenue in excess of $3.5 billion had to flow into the newly established 
Sustainability Fund. Should actual amounts of resource revenues fall below $3.5 billion, the difference could be allocated 
from the Sustainability Fund to the budget. In this way, then, the purpose of the Sustainability Fund was to act as a 
budgetary shock absorber in the face of fluctuations in resource revenues. See Kneebone (2006) for details on legislation 
meant to limit the government’s access to energy revenues.
9the non-energy primary deficit of the late 1980s and eventually led to the dramatic cuts to spending 
that followed the election of the Klein government.
DO NOT BE DECEIVED: BAD COMPANY RUINS GOOD MORALS
In this brief review of the history of the provincial government’s fiscal policy choices we have 
emphasized how the choices of the Alberta government have varied with one of its largest, but also 
easily its most volatile sources of revenue. Our last figure, Figure 4, is intended to show how the 
size of the non-energy primary deficit has varied in relation to energy revenues collected by the 
government in the previous fiscal year (both measured in real per capita dollars).19
FIGURE 4 THE NON-ENERGY PRIMARY DEFICIT VS. ENERGY REVENUES
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The trend line drawn through these data show that, on average over our 50-year sample, an extra 
dollar of energy revenue collected in the previous year has been associated with a $0.49 increase in 
the size of the non-energy primary deficit.20 
The positive relationship indicates that an increase in energy revenues encourages policy-makers 
to allow their non-energy budget deficit to grow. The idea that revenue obtained by ways other than 
taxing voters might encourage governments to budget differently than otherwise is well known in 
the literature. Political economists have coined the term “fiscal illusion” to describe the tendency 
for taxpayers to systematically underestimate the true cost of publicly provided goods and services. 
The illusion arises because of the difficulty taxpayers have in understanding how much they pay 
in taxes toward specific programs. Generally speaking, a fiscal illusion arises when governments 
19 
A simple regression of these data yield the following results (values in parentheses are standard errors associated with the 
estimated coefficients): 
Non-Energy Primary Deficit = 759.5 + 0.493*Energy Revenues
-1
 
(311.9) (0.09) 
adjR2 = 0.38       n = 51
20 
The non-energy primary deficit can increase because program spending increased, because non-energy revenue decreased, 
or some combination of these outcomes. Further investigation shows that the response is mainly in the form of an increase 
in program spending. For a far more sophisticated and careful analysis of the relationship between budget components and 
energy revenues see Ferede (2018).
10
rely on indirect ways of funding expenditures. Provincial governments extract revenue from 
taxpayers directly via income taxes, less directly via sales taxes, less directly again via the revenue 
they receive from the federal government in the form of intergovernmental transfers, and even 
less directly still by the revenue they gain from taxing the rents earned on the development of 
natural resources. The trend shown in Figure 4 is consistent with the fiscal-illusion hypothesis: As 
the availability of resource revenues grows, governments in Alberta have found it easier to find 
political support for financing increases in program spending.
CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
The purpose of this short note was to introduce a new time series of data describing the 
government of Alberta’s finances over the period 1965–66 to 2016–17. To illustrate the value of 
having such a long time series, we have provided a broad-strokes description of how those finances 
have evolved over time and in particular how they have responded to changes in the revenues the 
provincial government receives as the result of the sale of non-renewable resources.
Government budgets show the consequences of policy choices. A key policy choice that has 
seriously impacted the government of Alberta’s finances is the question of what to do with non-
renewable-resource revenues. The literature on the appropriate budgetary treatment of such 
revenues is old and convincing: non-renewable-resource revenues ought to be saved, and in 
this way a non-renewable resource can be turned into a renewable monetary asset. With the 
establishment of the AHSTF in 1976, the government took steps toward that policy by announcing 
a decision to save 30 per cent of energy royalties. But this commitment ended with the first sign 
of fiscal pressures in the early 1980s. In ways we summarized in our discussion, the government 
tried a number of strategies to reduce its reliance on energy revenue, but success came only after a 
dramatic cut to program spending in the mid-1990s. Only during this brief period in the mid-1990s 
has the government been able to fund current expenditures without the need for energy revenues. 
To use a phrase made popular in the 2015 provincial election campaign, for that brief period in the 
mid-1990s, the government had managed to climb “off the energy roller-coaster.” But it could not 
stay off, and the government, with the support of voters, returned to a pattern of financing spending 
growth not with taxation but with energy revenues.
At the time of writing this note, the current government is suffering the consequences of a budget 
based on spending and tax choices that require a heavy reliance on energy revenues to find balance. 
Getting off the energy roller coaster requires new revenue, cuts to program spending, or some 
combination of the two. To remain off the roller coaster requires a commitment of the sort previous 
governments have been unable to stick to.
***
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DATA APPENDIX
Details on the construction of our data set for the years 1980–81 to 2013–14 are available from 
Kneebone and Wilkins (2016). Using the approach described there, the data set was extended 
to 2016–17. Beginning with fiscal year 2015–16, the government changed its accounting by 
adopting a consolidated budget. To continue our time series using the same accounting approach 
used in earlier years, certain adjustments to the public accounts are required. These adjustments 
are described in Kneebone and Wilkins (2018) and enable us to extend the dataset to 2016–17. 
Extending the data set back to 1965–66 was done by collecting data from public accounts. Our 
main concern was to ensure the data we report for the period 1965–66 to 1979–80 correspond as 
closely as possible to the data for 1980–81 forward. To maintain consistency, we made a number of 
adjustments to the General Revenue Fund data presented in the public accounts:
• We removed “Renter Assistance Tax Credits and Royalty Tax Rebates And Credits” from
“Individual Income Tax” in years when those line items appear in the public accounts prior
to 1977–78.
• For 1969–70 to 1971–72, the public accounts did not report personal and corporate income
tax revenues separately. Statistics Canada reports these separate values in “Public Finance
Historical Data, 1965–66–1991/92.” The sum of these values exactly matches the total
reported in the public accounts and so we rely on these values for our personal- and
corporation-income-tax-revenue series.
• We removed “royalty tax rebates and credits” from “corporation income tax” in the years
leading up to 1977–78.
• For the years 1975–76 to 1980–81, our data on health expenditures are the amounts in the
public accounts reported as “Hospitals and Medical Care” plus two amounts reported under
the Ministry of Social Services and Community Health as “Treatment for Mental Illness”
and “General Health Services.” For the years 1971–72 to 1974–75 our Health data is the
amount reported as “Health Commissions” plus two amounts taken from Health and Social
Development, namely, “Mental Illness” and “General Health” whenever they appear. For
years prior to 1971–72 we use the amount reported in the public accounts as “Health.”
• Our data on social services expenditure are the amounts in the public accounts reported
as “Social Services and Community Care” (1975–76 to 1980–81), “Health and Social
Development” (1971–72 to 1974–75) and “Social Development” (1970–71). From these
amounts we subtract “Treatment for Mental Illness” and “General Health Services” whenever
those amounts appear as line entries in the ministry budget.
• Our data on education spending include K-12 plus advanced education. They are generally
the sum of what is identified in the public accounts as “Advanced Education” and
“Education.” From 1975-76 onward we subtract “Manpower Development and Training
Assistance” from Advanced Education whenever it appears.
The following table reports our data, in nominal dollars.
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1965-66 41 31 0 76 248 0 180 576 114 46 123 131 413 2 415 -160
1966-67 56 27 0 97 240 0 190 609 140 51 169 178 538 2 540 -70
1967-68 80 40 0 120 219 0 341 800 174 56 207 433 870 2 872 72
1968-69 98 50 0 147 284 0 404 983 197 63 274 378 912 4 916 -67
1969-70 134 64 0 162 255 0 384 1,000 209 74 308 391 982 4 986 -14
1970-71 182 58 0 194 231 0 452 1,116 234 89 379 418 1,120 9 1,129 12
1971-72 192 68 0 241 273 0 472 1,247 261 102 302 586 1,250 17 1,267 20
1972-73 232 98 0 225 331 0 523 1,409 270 129 426 523 1,348 23 1,371 -38
1973-74 289 113 0 343 639 0 363 1,748 293 155 450 582 1,480 24 1,504 -244
1974-75 347 277 0 498 1,520 0 288 2,930 396 182 517 952 2,046 31 2,077 -853
1975-76 352 261 0 451 1,680 0 584 3,328 549 251 735 1,155 2,689 32 2,721 -607
1976-77 439 138 0 561 -53 2,120 636 1,722 614 297 805 1,179 2,895 25 2,920 1,198
1977-78 574 264 0 514 2,147 931 780 4,279 655 368 1,032 1,304 3,359 22 3,381 -898
1978-79 660 294 0 541 2,533 1,059 883 4,911 761 380 979 1,558 3,677 26 3,704 -1,207
1979-80 772 209 0 598 3,162 1,332 943 5,684 882 427 1,098 3,270 5,677 20 5,697 13
1980-81 938 435 0 670 3,364 1,445 1,207 6,614 1,141 532 1,250 4,046 6,968 22 6,990 376
1981-82 1,323 581 0 1,145 3,314 1,434 3,074 9,437 1,874 703 2,034 4,100 8,647 26 8,738 -699
1982-83 1,650 609 0 1,167 2,752 1,370 3,415 9,593 2,438 918 2,473 5,875 11,704 55 11,759 2,166
1983-84 1,510 782 0 1,308 4,059 720 3,574 11,233 2,724 985 2,627 5,317 11,653 171 11,824 591
1984-85 1,457 828 0 1,686 4,493 736 4,083 12,547 2,731 1,051 2,783 5,245 11,810 228 12,038 -509
1985-86 1,521 780 0 1,788 4,247 685 4,273 13,294 3,003 1,156 2,961 6,753 13,873 182 14,055 761
1986-87 1,768 396 0 1,689 1,675 217 3,872 9,400 3,244 1,270 3,114 5,725 13,353 297 13,650 4,250
1987-88 2,236 595 0 1,912 2,626 0 4,536 11,905 3,114 1,329 3,118 5,137 12,698 572 13,270 1,365
1988-89 2,039 697 0 2,135 2,085 0 4,944 11,900 3,372 1,434 3,227 5,077 13,110 797 13,907 2,007
1989-90 2,536 700 0 1,943 2,240 0 5,420 12,839 3,631 1,502 3,379 5,328 13,840 1,115 14,955 2,116
1990-91 2,796 803 0 2,365 2,688 0 5,533 14,185 3,895 1,567 3,532 5,741 14,735 1,282 16,017 1,832
1991-92 3,057 731 0 2,150 2,022 0 5,777 13,737 4,129 1,746 3,676 5,501 15,052 1,314 16,366 2,629
1992-93 2,794 637 0 2,457 2,183 0 6,200 14,271 4,352 1,889 3,904 6,031 16,176 1,419 17,595 3,324
1993-94 2,877 854 0 2,090 2,817 0 6,768 15,406 4,194 1,721 4,036 5,172 15,123 1,654 16,777 1,371
1994-95 3,063 1,073 0 1,929 3,378 0 6,721 16,164 3,928 1,495 3,756 4,301 13,480 1,746 15,226 -938
1995-96 3,177 1,332 0 1,748 2,786 0 6,472 15,515 3,773 1,456 3,713 3,739 12,681 1,683 14,364 -1,151
1996-97 3,445 1,407 0 1,351 4,034 0 6,415 16,652 4,006 1,511 3,738 3,446 12,701 1,462 14,163 -2,489
1997-98 3,877 1,849 0 1,183 3,778 0 7,067 17,754 4,401 1,564 4,081 3,727 13,773 1,322 15,095 -2,659
1998-99 4,601 1,659 0 1,335 2,368 0 6,856 16,819 4,660 1,560 4,241 3,885 14,346 1,379 15,725 -1,094
1999-00 5,100 1,255 0 1,640 4,650 0 7,458 20,103 5,341 1,668 4,735 4,612 16,356 956 17,312 -2,791
2000-01 3,943 2,023 0 1,813 10,586 0 7,162 25,527 5,946 1,790 5,040 5,200 17,976 980 18,956 -6,571
2001-02 4,183 2,229 0 2,264 6,227 0 7,023 21,926 6,846 1,942 6,099 5,184 20,071 774 20,845 -1,081
2002-03 4,834 2,019 0 2,074 7,130 0 6,605 22,662 6,917 2,108 5,461 5,567 20,053 476 20,529 -2,133
2003-04 4,613 1,696 0 2,926 7,676 0 8,976 25,887 7,646 2,272 5,854 5,708 21,480 271 21,751 -4,136
2004-05 4,649 2,364 0 3,219 9,744 0 9,352 29,328 9,059 2,438 6,370 5,984 23,851 302 24,153 -5,175
2005-06 4,677 2,917 0 3,392 14,347 0 10,209 35,542 9,709 2,707 6,900 7,427 26,743 248 26,991 -8,551
2006-07 7,622 3,606 0 3,077 12,260 0 11,452 38,017 10,880 2,879 7,817 7,716 29,292 215 29,507 -8,510
2007-08 8,271 4,695 0 3,048 11,024 0 11,131 38,169 12,286 3,117 8,886 9,085 33,374 214 33,588 -4,581
2008-09 8,708 4,252 0 4,185 11,915 0 6,751 35,811 13,107 3,417 9,411 10,520 36,455 208 36,663 852
2009-10 7,877 4,754 0 4,941 6,768 0 11,318 35,658 13,180 3,807 9,538 9,802 36,327 363 36,690 1,032
2010-11 7,631 3,334 0 5,025 8,428 0 10,616 35,034 15,034 4,129 9,276 9,533 37,972 472 38,444 3,410
2011-12 8,563 3,678 0 4,777 11,636 0 10,889 39,543 15,562 4,278 9,271 9,956 39,067 499 39,566 23
2012-13 9,621 4,756 0 4,804 7,779 0 11,796 38,756 16,529 4,641 9,311 10,605 41,086 512 41,598 2,842
2013-14 10,537 5,488 0 6,729 9,578 0 12,961 45,293 17,091 4,762 9,095 13,000 43,948 590 44,538 -755
2014-15 11,042 5,796 0 5,661 8,948 0 13,835 45,282 18,131 4,638 9,385 10,979 43,133 714 43,847 -1,435
2015-16 11,357 4,195 0 6,738 2,789 0 11,372 36,451 19,117 4,752 9,678 9,441 42,988 710 43,698 7,247
2016-17 10,763 3,769 0 7,451 3,097 0 10,733 35,813 19,716 5,198 10,034 11,766 46,713 949 47,662 11,848
$ millions
Other Program 
Expenditure
Total Program 
Expend.
Education
Energy Revenue 
Transferred to 
AHSTF
Fiscal Year
Revenue Expenditure
Annual 
Deficit
Personal 
Income Tax
Corporation 
Income Tax
Retail 
Sales Tax
Total  
Expenditure
Resource 
Revenue
Other Own-
Source 
Revenue
Total Revenue
Federal 
Transfers
Debt 
Service
Health
Social 
Services
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